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Can you teach an old seadog new tricks? 
Experimental evaluation of BRM training 
in the commercial fleet
Abstract
Objective: The objective of the present study was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) training in the commercial shipping fleet – 
termed Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training.
Background: CRM training has been widely employed and researched in several 
high reliability settings. However, there is a lack of experimental studies assessing 
CRM training in commercial shipping.
Method: An experimental pretest – posttest study measuring satisfaction with 
training, knowledge, attitudes, and team behavior in bridge simulators. Five 
hypotheses were made; H1) The BRM training will receive positive evaluation, H2) 
BRM training will improve knowledge, H3) BRM training will improve attitudes, H4) 
BRM training will improve behavior, H5) The relationship between Teamwork and 
Mission success is positively mediated by Situation awareness. 
Results: H1 was fully supported. H2 was fully supported. H3 was partly supported. 
H4 was not supported. H5 was fully supported.
Conclusion: The training was positively evaluated and improved knowledge and 
some of the targeted attitudes. Behavior could not be shown to improve with 
statistical significance, but it cannot be ruled out that a stronger experimental 
design and increased sample size would yield significant results. Relations among 
behavior measures confirms established CRM theory.
Application: The present study provides supporting evidence that BRM training 
can indeed improve safety-relevant knowledge and attitudes. However, to improve 
behavior on the bridge, training should be adapted to specific work procedures.
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Introduction
The International maritime organization (IMO) has 
declared shipping as one of the most dangerous indu-
stries in the world (2011). Personnel on board face 
complex and dangerous machinery, often made worse 
by heavy sea and challenging navigation. Human errors 
in this environment can have serious consequences, 
leading to collisions and explosions with a potential to 
be both enormous and tragic. The risk becomes even 
greater when operating far away from first-responder 
assistance (Hetherington, Flin, Mearns, 2006). To 
prepare for such a high-risk environment and to avoid 
accidents, proper training becomes a major concern 
for maritime organizations (International Maritime 
Organization, 2002). 
 Crew Resource Management (CRM) training em- 
erged in the airline industry after several major accidents 
during the 1970s, when the authorities acknowledged 
that technical competence alone was not sufficient 
to guarantee safe performance (Rutherford, Flin & 
Mitchell, 2012). 30 years later the CRM training has 
transferred to other high-risk organizations, such as 
healthcare, military, offshore industry and nuclear 
plants. In 2010 CRM training became mandatory for 
the maritime industry in the Manila amendments to the 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers (STCW) regulations (International 
Maritime Organization, 2011).
 However, CRM training is not unproblematic. Despite 
decades of CRM training of teams in high-risk organi- 
zations such as shipping, health care and military there is 
still considerable uncertainty whether this type of training 
actually increases safety (Salas et. al., 2006). One reason 
could be that there seems to be no established agreement 
as to what CRM training should entail (O’Connor, 2008), 
making it problematic to transfer training strategies 
between domains. Musson and Helmreich (2004) under- 
line that CRM training tends to be domain specific, both 
organizationally and culturally. Specifically, the automatic 
transplantation of CRM training in aviation to maritime 
BRM training has been suggested as an explanation for 
the lack of results within bridge crews (O’Connor, 2011). 
In the maritime domain, the regulations put forward in 
2010 (International Maritime Organization, 2011) makes 
BRM and ERM training mandatory to achieve maritime 
certificates.  IMO does not however, present or list specific 
contents for BRM courses in a separate paragraph in the 
STCW manual. Typical CRM topics are spread out and 
inserted into various chapters and paragraphs that existed 
before the 2010 amendments, which make it difficult for 
instructors and training establishments to construct 
standardized BRM curriculums. 
 Despite the domain specific differences, the objec- 
tive of resource management courses is established 
through a common conceptual perspective. Salas et. al. 
(2006) stated in a review that CRM courses (i.e. BRM 
or ERM in the maritime domain) are intended to 
increase knowledge, awareness and skills around the 
importance of clarity of roles, clear communication, 
and situation awareness. Within this perspective, highly 
reliable organizations will work towards avoiding 
accidents by collectively identifying and managing 
evolving threats. Hence, team members are encouraged 
to continuously scan for threats and to speak up when 
they identify potential threats, regardless of their status 
in the hierarchy or their defined role (Weick, 2002). A 
CRM course is intended to train and build awareness 
around teamwork behavior that enhance a common 
understanding of the situation at hand, eventually 
resulting in higher performance or mission success. 
Theoretical perspectives involve individual learning 
(mental models), teamwork behaviors that enhance and 
maintain shared mental models and situation awareness 
(Endsley, 2015, Espevik & Olsen, 2013). 
 Previous studies have predominantly used under- 
graduate students (e.g. Stout 1999) or aviator trainees 
(Salas, E., Cannon-Bowers, Rhodenizer, & Bowers, 1999). 
Salas, DiazGranados, Weaver, & King (2008) underlined 
the importance of studying teams in the wild (i.e. when 
operating their normal job at sea). In the maritime 
domain, there is a lack of true experimental studies 
evaluating BRM courses, especially for the commercial 
fleet. The few existing studies of BRM and related 
training is either limited to participant satisfaction 
(Håvold et al., 2015), or to navy samples (O’Connor, 
2011; Röttger, 2016). 
 The present study will examine the effectiveness of 
BRM training on knowledge, attitudes and behavior in 
experienced bridge officers through an experimental 
evaluation of a commercial BRM training program 
performed for a Norwegian ship owner. The core of 
this BRM training program evolves around teamwork 
behavior that builds situation awareness and shared 
mental models.
Theory
The present theoretical perspective is outlined as an 
Input-Process-Outcome model (IPO; see Figure 1). 
The BRM course was constructed and performed to 
give knowledge about, attitudes towards, and training 
of, teamwork behavior. This teamwork behavior is 
understood as Input, which will result in a Process, 
i.e. better mental models, which enhance Situation 
awareness (understanding - “what is happening”) and 
Shared mental models (coordination behavior -  “what 
to do”). The outcome of all this is better performance 
(e.g., mission success).
 The input in the BRM course is theoretical and 
practical training on teamwork behavior. Salas, Sims and 
Burke (2005) presented a model of teamwork integrating 
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the most commonly discussed variables that had the 
greatest eff ect on team performance. Th ey suggested 5 
core components, all of them vital to develop and fl ourish 
situational awareness and shared mental models. Th e 
fi rst core component is team leadership, which entails 
the ability to direct and coordinate the activities of 
other team members. Second, mutual performance 
monitoring, which is the ability to apply appropriate 
task strategies to develop common understanding of 
the team environment. Th ird, backup behavior, which 
entails team members’ ability to anticipate each other’s 
needs through knowledge about their responsibilities. 
Fourth, adaptability, which concerns the team’s ability 
to adjust team strategies and alter course of action based 
on information gathered from the environment. Th e last 
one, team orientation is an attitude characterized by a 
tendency to take team members behavior and input into 
account during group interaction, and that team goals 
are placed above individual goals. 
 Knowledge about, attitudes towards and training of
these teamwork behaviors intends to enhance a team
member’s mental models of the environment he or
she is supposed to operate in. Mental models are the 
mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate des-
criptions of a system’s purpose and form, explanations 
of its functioning and observed states, and predictions 
of future system states (Rouse & Morris, 1986). Th is 
is in line with Endsley (2015), as the three stages of 
Situation awareness (SA) correspond to the three pur-
poses of mental models, namely detecting (elements 
in the environment), explaining (their meaning) and 
predicting (their future status).  
 Endsley (1995) defi nes situation awareness as ‘Th e 
perception of the elements in the environment within 
a volume of time and space, the comprehension of 
their meaning and the projection of their status in the 
near future’. Th is indicates that SA is as dynamic as the 
situation. When new information emerges, SA needs to 
be updated and changed, thus made possible by the fi ve 
core teamwork behavior (Salas et.al., 2005). Although 
Endsley labels SA as a state, it can be argued that she 
describes three cognitive processes or functions, namely 
perception, comprehension and projection (Salmon 
et al., 2006). Perception involves detection of critical 
signals that are clearly observable and meaningful pieces 
of information (Level 1). Comprehension (Level 2) 
involves interpreting and combining relevant perceived 
information in order to grasp a correct understanding 
related to a goal. Projections (Level 3) represent 
forethought where the decision makers predict the 
status in near future. Th us, SA could be considered as the 
decision maker's internal model and forms the basis for 
decisions made. Lack of SA has been stated as the cause 
of human errors in critical situations. Sneddon, Mearns 
and Flin (2006) reported that 67% of errors made in their 
material were caused by lack of Level 1 SA; a failure to 
detect critical signals. 20 % of the accidents were caused 
by a lack of correct understanding of the situation (Level 
2) and 13% was caused by a failure to correctly predict 
possible future states of the situation (Level 3).  When 
further investigating the causes of poor SA, the main 
reason for a failure in Level 1 was found as failure to 
monitor or distraction causing reduced attention to the 
task at hand. In addition, a low ability to prioritize the 
available information resulted in information overload, 
and critical signals were not detected. 
 Operational decision making is most oft en done 
in a team setting. A related concept to SA is “shared 
mental models” (SMM). SMM is defi ned as a shared 
organized understanding and mental representation of 
key elements of the team’s relevant environment. Th ese 
shared mental models enable team members to form 
accurate explanations and expectations of the task. Th is 
will in turn enable team members to coordinate their 
actions and adapt their behavior to the demands of the 
task and to fellow team members (Converse, Cannon-
Figure 1. An Input-Process-Outcome model of BRM training.
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Bowers Salas, 1993). SMMs are assumed to enable team 
members to predict task needs and the actions of other 
team members, and thus enable them to adapt their own 
behavior accordingly without communicating explicitly. 
In a meta-analysis, DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus (2010) 
showed a number of studies indicating that SMMs 
contribute to increased team effectiveness (e.g. Stout, 
Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999).  In a series 
of simulator studies Espevik, Johnsen, Eid & Thayer 
(2006) found that operational submarine attack teams 
with a high degree of SMMs had better performance 
than other teams. Furthermore, Naval teams with 
high degree of SMMs showed better coordination and 
performance when two teams had to coordinate their 
effort towards a common goal, compared to low SMM-
teams (Espevik, Johnsen & Eid, 2011 a). Finally, high 
SMM teams showed improved learning using cross 
training in high intensity simulation compared to low 
SMM-teams (Espevik, Johnsen & Eid, 2011 b). Thus, 
training focusing on the importance of developing 
SMMs is important within the maritime domain. 
 As previously described, CRM training started in the 
aviation community and quickly spread to other high 
reliability settings such as armed forces, nuclear energy 
and healthcare. Since the 1990s healthcare has been the 
leading domain for research, providing ample evidence 
for the effectiveness of CRM training (Flin, O’Connor, 
& Crichton, 2008; Hughes et al., 2016; Weaver et al., 
2010). However, when it comes to the maritime domain, 
studies are scarce. Most of them are set within the 
surface warfare community (O’Connor, 2011; Röttger 
et al., 2013; 2016) and the one set in the commercial 
fleet only deals with the self-reported post training 
satisfaction (Håvold et al., 2015). Hence, the present 
study sets out to contribute to the knowledgebase 
regarding BRM courses for the commercial fleet by 
evaluating the effectiveness of such a course arranged 
for a Norwegian ship owner.
Evaluating BRM effectiveness
Kirkpatrick’s (1976; 2009) hierarchy is an often-used 
and valued framework for guiding training evaluation, 
and consists of four different levels: reactions, learning, 
behavior and organizational impact (see O’Connor, 
Campbell, Newon, Melton, Salas and Wilson, 2008; 
Salas et.al., 2006). This framework entails firstly, 
reaction to cover the degree to which the participants 
find the time spent worthwhile, or put simply, if they 
like the training. Secondly there is the level of learning 
which means that the training was understood and 
absorbed. Learning consists of acquiring knowledge, 
and personal knowledge is defined as ‘the cognitive 
resources which a person brings to a situation that 
enable him or her to think and perform’ (Eraut, 2000). 
In assessment terms, learning corresponds to written 
tests assessing theoretical knowledge. Thirdly, behavior 
is the assessment of whether knowledge learned in 
training actually transfers to behaviors in a work setting 
(in our case a work setting in a simulated environment). 
Fourthly the highest level, Organizational impact, to 
provide evidence for improved safety and effectives in 
the daily operation of the organization. The findings on 
the three last levels, learning, behavior and organi- 
zational impact are scarce (Salas et.al., 2006), and too 
our knowledge almost non-existent within the commer- 
cial maritime domain. 
Hypotheses
There is considerable evidence for self-reports that 
participants value CRM training (DeChurch, et.al. 2010; 
Espevik, Saus, & Olsen, 2017) or level one, reaction in 
the hierarchy proposed by Kirkpatrick (2009). Although 
it is a very basic indicator of training quality, it is still a 
necessary part of training, and with the ample evidence 
in the literature a mean evaluation score higher than 
“uncertain” is expected.
 H1) The BRM training should receive positive 
   evaluation.
Although the few studies most relevant produces mixed 
evidence for increasing knowledge (O’Connor, 2011; 
Röttger et al., 2016), the training program evaluated 
in the present study was informed by these findings. 
Specifically, O’Connor (2011) presented failing to 
adapt training to the maritime domain as the cause of 
his null-finding regarding knowledge. This was a key 
instructive finding informing the establishment of the 
present training program, and great care was taken to 
adapt the training to the maritime domain. In addition, 
improving knowledge is a key outcome for the present 
training. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the BRM 
training should in fact improve knowledge.
 H2) BRM training will improve knowledge.
Both of the most relevant studies showed no evidence 
for improved attitudes (O’Connor, 2011; Röttger et 
al., 2016). However, again, O’Connor (2011) failed to 
adapt training to the maritime domain, and Röttger et 
al. (2016) only used classroom training. In addition, 
improving attitudes is a key learning objective for 
the present training. Hence, we expect the training to 
improve attitudes.
 H3) BRM training will improve attitudes.
No study has yet produced evidence for behavior change 
by BRM training in the maritime domain. Furthermore, 
fundamental tenets of the cognitive psychological 
paradigm would suggest that knowledge and attitudes 
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are indirect determiners of behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). However, it has long been an established fact 
that change in behavior is more diffi  cult than change 
in knowledge (Hollenbeck, van Knippenberg, & 
Ilgen, 2017), and this challenge is confounded when 
applied to a group setting such as in the present study 
(Lewin, 1943; 1947). Nevertheless, the Kirkpatrick 
paradigm suggests behavior change as a separate level 
of evaluation. Furthermore, in the present study, it is of 
course a main motivation for BRM courses that training 
teamwork behavior should lead to behavioral change.
 H4) BRM-training will improve behavior
According to established theory on the role of Teamwork 
and situation awareness for Mission success, we expect 
these behavioral measures to be related at Time 1 (prior 
to training) and at Time 2 (subsequent to training). 
In other words: the diff erent behavioral measures 
are related for each team in each exercise, such that a 
there is a relationship between a team’s Teamwork to 
their Mission success positively mediated by Situation 
awareness (see e.g. Espevik et al., 2006; 2011a; 2011b; 
Stout et al., 1999). See Figure 2. for a conceptual model 
for H5.
 H5) Th e relationship between Teamwork and Miss-
   ion success is positively mediated by Situation 
   awareness at each point in time.
 
(see Table 1). All participants received the same theo-
retical training and practical simulator exercises. Control 
was achieved with random assignment of the two 
scenarios (A and B) used for simulation exercises so that 
one half of participants did A-B and the other half did 
B-A. Hence, all participants received treatment between 
pre- and posttest. In addition, random assignment was 
employed of teams to bridge simulator and assessor 
for each course week comprising four teams per week. 
Th us, any variation in execution between course weeks
aff ected each experimental condition equally. Assign-
ment of participants followed a random stratifi ed app-
roach, stratifying according to rank. Th e result was that 
most teams had one team member with superior rank to 
the rest, usually a captain. No teams had junior offi  cers 
only. Each team consisted of 3 members, except for a 
minor number of teams with only two participants due 
to absentees.
Training and Simulator Scenarios
Th e BRM course consisted of four simulator scenarios 
in total. Th e fi rst is a simple transit scenario without 
critical incidents to familiarize the participants with 
the simulator. Th e third scenario was a Search and 
Rescue (SAR) scenario given the same to all groups 
as part of the training. Th e second (scenario A) and 
fourth (scenario B) scenarios presented were the two 
scenarios developed specially for the present study, 
although they could have been used in any regular 
BRM course: Scenario 2 (A) involved personnel injury 
on deck in an off shore setting, meaning that the bridge 
team must make the transition from a standard cargo 
delivery operation to a critical evacuation of injured 
personnel, a taxing team eff ort inducing stress. Scenario 
4 (B) involved GPS deviance during a navigational 
exercise in coastal waters, testing the team’s ability 
to maintain Situation awareness; discovering the 
GPS deviance through active information gathering 
and understanding that the GPS derived position is 
incorrect in the electronic charts (Electronic Chart and 
Display and Information System – ECDIS). 
 Th e total length of the BRM training was fi ve days. 
According to the Norwegian Maritime Authority’s (NMA)
interpretation at the time of the international regulations 
concerning BRM training – Standards of Training, 
Certifi cation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 
(International Maritime Organization, 2011), the 
recommended length of a BRM course was four days. 
Th e study included the recommended four days for 
training, consisting of two days classroom lectures and 
two days simulation training and observation including 
feedback sessions – using scenario 3. Th e pre- and post-
tests constituted one extra day in duration, bringing this 
specifi c course up to fi ve days.
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model of the relationship of Teamwork 
mediated through Situation awareness on Mission Success.
Conceptual model for the mediation models is showed in the 








Th e study was set up as a pretest - posttest experimental 
design. All participants were subject to surveys and 
simulator tests prior to, and subsequent to, BRM training
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Table 1. Schematic illustration of experimental design. 
a) Th e familiarization is not a measurement and not the intended experimental manipulation but a necessary preparation 
of the participants to the equipment on the simulator bridge.
Participants
A total of 94 experienced bridge offi  cers participated 
in the study, 95.7% men. Th e age span was 23 to 62, 
(M=39.9, SD=10.1) and the seniority span was .5 to 34 
years (M=6.2, SD=7.2). 35.5% were ranked as captains, 
23.7% Chief mates, and 40,9% were fi rst mates. Due to 
some missing values in either pre- or post-forms, the 
questionnaire analyses were performed with 79 to 80 
participants.
Instruments   
Satisfaction: An 8-item rating scale was used as part 
of the training centre’s standard evaluation form. Th e 
scale is developed to rate satisfaction with simulation 
training and contain the following statements: 1) 
Th e course was adequate to my previous knowledge. 
2) Th e content held a high professional level. 3) Th e 
content was relevant for my work. 4) Th e simulators 
are realistic. 5) Th e simulator exercises are realistic. 6) 
Our teaching methods are good. 7) Course facilities 
are satisfactory. 8) All together a good course. A sum 
score was then computed based on the responses, and 
the scale had a satisfactory consistency (cronbach’s 
alpha = .78).
 Knowledge: A 10-item multiple-choice test was 
taken with permission from O’Connor (2011) and 
is described there. A sum score was then computed 
based on the responses.
 Attitudes: A 26 item Ship Management Attiudes 
Questionnaire (SMAQ) was taken with permission 
from Andersen, Garay and Itoh (1997). Each statement 
was followed by a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Fully 
disagree; 5 = Fully agree). An explorative factor analysis 
(see Table 2) produced fi ve attitudinal categories:  1) 
My stress, 2) Stress of others, 3) Communication and 
coordination, 4) Command and responsibility, and 5) 
Revealing short comings.
Psychometric analysis
Several variations of SMAQ questionnaires have 
followed from the original classifi cation of Helmreich 
and Merrit (1998). However, they do not agree on a 
common factor structure, which is to be expected 
from the little extent of actual overlap in items. 
Hence, the present study needed to establish its own 
factor structure (see, Andersen et al., 1999; O’Connor, 
2011; Röttger et al, 2012). A principal Axis Factor 
(PAF) with Oblimin (oblique) rotation was run on 
the SMAQ items at Time 1 and yielded an adequate 
factor solution explaining 63.6% of the variance. An 
examination of the s Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure 
of sampling adequacy suggested that the sample was 
favorable (KMO=.675), and Bartlett’s test of Sphericity 
was signifi cant. Eigenvalue’s and the scree plot both 
suggested fi ve factors (see Table 2.)
 Th e are some correlations among the factors both at 
Time 1 and Time 2, indicating support for an oblique 
rotation (see Table 3.). In terms of test-retest reliability, 
the factors correlate around r=.60*** with the exception 
of factor 3 (Stress of Others), which has a r of =.27 *.
 In terms of internal consistency, the factors show 
acceptable values of Cronbach alpha for the fi rst two 
factors, and increasingly lower factors for the other 
three, but here the alphas should be considered in light 
of the low number of items (see Table 3). Th ere is also 
a decreasing trend from Time 1 to Time 2 in internal 
consistency, especially with factor 3. Th is is in some 
degree expected as the study actively aims to change 
the attitudes.
 Behavior: Th e behavior was rated by three subject 
matter experts based on video-recordings of Scenarios 
A and B. Th ese observers were blind to whether the 
exercises were performed pre or post training. Th ree 
measures of behavior were rated: Teamwork, Situation 
awareness and Mission success.
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Table 2. Factor analysis of SMAQ with factor loadings Time 1.
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Factors: 1 = 
Communication /coordination; 2 = My stress; 3 = Stress of others; 4 = Command and responsibility; 5 = Revealing short 
comings. (Factor loadings =>.40).
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Teamwork: to extract teamwork, 8 teamwork constructs 
of the Royal Norwegian Naval Acadamy (RNoNA) 
assessment tool was used. Th e RNoNA assessment tool 
is designed to assess the performance of military teams 
participating in complex military training exercises 
(Mjelde et.al, 2016).  Th e purpose is to evaluate the 
teams’ ability to communicate critical information 
to maximize collective performance, based on Salas 
et.al (2006) fi ve teamwork processes.  For example, 
for Backup behavior, Subject matter experts rated the 
backup behavior they observed by rating the following 
claim on a 7-point Likert scale from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (7): Th e team showed a high degree 
of backup behavior, i.e. team members helped/assisted 
without being asked, or pushed information.
 Situation awareness: Two clearly discernable inci-
dents were identifi ed within each scenario. For example, 
in the "Stress scenario" the fi rst incident was the 
initial awareness regarding an injury on deck, and the 
second incident was the subsequent awareness when 
the situation had evolved to the point when it became 
clear that helicopter evacuation was 45 minutes away. 
Th ese incidents were rated by subject matter experts in 
accordance with Endsley’s (1995; 2015) description of 
levels of situation awareness. For example, perception 
(quickly perceived the injury), understanding (correctly 
understood the situation) and prediction (correctly 
predicted potential outcomes). A mean Situation aware-
ness score was computed from the three observed 
levels of Situation awareness rated for each incident (six 
observations in total for each scenario).
 Mission success: Th e same two incidents were also
rated as to what degree the teams performed a satisfactory
action to control the incident from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree), in accordance with recommen-
dation of Salas, Tannenbaum, Kraiger, and Smith-Jentsch
(2012). A mean score for Mission success was computed 
from the two incident scores. 
Procedure
A questionnaire containing instruments measuring 
knowledge and attitudes were fi lled out by the partici-
pants prior to- and following the training. Th e behavior 
measures were taken during two diff erent scenarios pre-
and post-treatment. Aft er being introduced to the course
and familiarized with the simulators, the pre-scenario 
was performed. Following classroom training and a simu-
lator exercise with plenary feedback, the post-scenario 
was performed.
 Participation was based on informed consent and the
gathering of data was approved by the Norwegian Data 
Authority for Social Sciences (NSD).
Table 3. Correlation matrix of SMAQ factors at Time 1 and Time 2 
with internal consistency (a).
(a) Cronbach alphas on the diagonal. (b) Corrected Item-total correlation. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (one-tailed)
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Table 4. Satisfaction, attitudes, knowledge, and behavior in simulator pre- and post- training with t-tests for change and Cohen's d 
with 95% Confidence Intervals. 
a) Measures for Teamwork, Situation awareness and Mission Success are given as team values only.
173
Hypothesis testing Analyses
Th e basic analyses, including descriptive, correlations, 
t-tests, and factor analysis were performed using IBM 
SPSS version 24.0® for Windows 10®. Eff ect sizes and 
95% confi dence intervals for these were computed 
using the MBESS package, version 3.5.1, with MBESS 
package version 4.4.3, (Kelley, 2018). H5 was tested with 
the process macros developed by Hayes (2013) through 
IBM SPSS 24.bbb0. Th e macros are based on standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (see Figure 2 for 
a conceptual model). As demonstrated by Preacher and 
Hayes (2004), this macro produces a test that is more 
rigorous than that of Baron and Kenny (1986) and at the 
same time avoids the bias of the Sobel (1982) approach. 
Preacher and Hayes (2004) achieved this by employing a 
bootstrapping procedure. Bootstrapping works by basing 
inferential procedures on concrete sampling distribution 
from the sample at hand, rather than traditional sampling 
distribution created by a hypothetical infi nite number of 
samples from the population of interest (Efron, 1982). 
Th e concrete sampling distribution thus refl ects the 
distribution of the sample, rendering the assumption of 
normality superfl uous, and allows the testing of mediators 
on small samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). A bootstrap 
sample of 10,000 was drawn (with replacement) and used 
for analysis of the mediation model.
Results
Descriptive results are given in Table 4 presenting 
measures pre- and post-training. Th e results of the 
hypothesis testing can be found in tables 4, 5 and 6 and 
is commented according to the order of the hypotheses 
given in the introduction.
Table 5. Regression results for the Teamwork mediation model at Time 1 (prior to manipulation) with results for alternative models. 
Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients with Confidence Intervals (Standard Errors in parentheses) Estimating Situation awareness 
and Mission Success. 
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001. a = the direct eff ect of X on M. iM = the direct eff ect of the constant on M. c' = the direct eff ect 
of X on Y. b = the direct eff ect of M on Y. iY = the direct eff ect of the constant on Y. d) Situation awareness on Mission 
Success mediated by Teamwork. e) Mission success on Teamwork mediated by Situation awareness. f) Mission Success on 
Situation awareness mediated by Teamwork.
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H1 posited that the BRM course would be evaluated 
higher than “uncertain-positive”. As illustrated in Table 
4, the diff erence between the mean score and “uncertain-
positive” is statistically signifi cant and a large eff ect.
H2 posited that the BRM course would increase the 
knowledge. As illustrated in Table 4, the increase in 
Knowledge is statistically signifi cant and a medium eff ect.
H3 posited that the BRM course would improve attitudes. 
As illustrated in Table 4, there is a statistically signifi cant 
improvement for Stress awareness, Team consideration, 
and very close to an improvement for Communication 
and coordination. Th ese are all small eff ects, and the 
confi dence interval for Communication and coordination 
includes 0, indicating a likelihood of no eff ect. Th e 
attitudes for Authoritarianism and Weakness toleration, 
however, showed no statistically signifi cant change. In 
terms of eff ect sizes, they are also small to negligible for 
both of these, the confi dence intervals include 0.
H4 posited that the BRM course would improve 
Behavior. However, there are no statistically signifi cant 
changes in the behavioral measures. In terms of eff ect 
sizes, they are also small to negligible and for all of these, 
the confi dence intervals include 0.
H5 posited that the relationship between Teamwork 
and Mission success is positively mediated by Situation 
awareness at each point in time.  According to Tables 5 
and 6, the hypothesized mediation model was signifi cant 
at both points in time at alpha level .01 or higher (pre- 
and post-training). In addition, none of the other possible 
mediation models were statistically signifi cant.
Table 6. Regression results for the Teamwork mediation model at Time 2 (subsequent to manipulation) with results for alternative 
models. Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients with Confidence Intervals (Standard Errors in parentheses) Estimating Situation 
awareness and Mission Success. 
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001. a = the direct eff ect of X on M. iM = the direct eff ect of the constant on M. c' = the direct 
eff ect of X on Y. b = the direct eff ect of M on Y. iY = the direct eff ect of the constant on Y. d) Situation awareness on Mission 
Success mediated by Teamwork. e) Mission Success on Teamwork mediated by Situation awareness. f) Mission Success on 




The present study employed a version of the SMAQ but 
does not entirely replicate the original structure. Instead 
the present analysis yields a factor structure that closely 
replicates that of Röttger, Vetter and Kowalski (2013) 
who’s three factors are all represented in the present 
study (F1, F2, and F4), and even more so O’Connor 
(2011) who also parcels out F3 from F2. The items of 
the fifth factor in the present study have elsewhere been 
placed under F1. However, they are very explicit in their 
dealing with the revealing of own short comings and 
invokes the language of shame, hence assigning them to 
a separate factor makes sense. It could also turn out that 
this result is due to either the sample being Norwegians, 
being commercial bridge officers, or both.
Hypotheses
Kirkpatrick’s (1976; 2009) recommendations for trai-
ning evaluation have been widely cited and has also 
informed the present study. Kirkpatrick (1976; 2009) 
conceptualizes training evaluation in four levels: 
1) Satisfaction, 2) Learning, 3) Behavior change and 
4) Organizational outcomes. In the present study, H1 
refers to level 1) Satisfaction, H2 and H3 both 
concerns level 2) Learning, as Kirkpatrick collapses 
attitudes and knowledge into one level. However, the 
conceptual separation of attitudes and knowledge is 
a basic underpinning assumption within cognitive 
psychology, hence the need for measuring knowledge 
and attitudes separately should be self-evident. H4 and 
H5 are concerned with Level 3) Behavior change. Level 
4 Organizational outcomes has not been measured in 
the present study.
H1 posited that the BRM course would be evaluated 
positively. H1 was fully and substantially supported. 
This is in accordance with considerable evidence for 
self-reports that participants value CRM training 
(DeChurch, et.al. 2010; Espevik, Saus, & Olsen, 2017).
H2 posited that the BRM course would increase the 
knowledge. H2 was fully and substantially supported. 
This finding is in accordance with some studies 
(Röttger et al., 2015), whereas other studies performed 
in the maritime domain have shown null-results and 
suggested that this was due to insufficient domain 
adaptation (O’Connor, 2011). The current support for 
H2 then, may be seen as supporting O'Connnor's (2011) 
claim about the importance of domain adapted training.
H3 posited that the BRM course would improve 
attitudes. H3 was partly supported. As with knowledge, 
the research literature gives hope, although the most 
relevant studies for the maritime domain has shown 
null results (O’Connor, 2011; Röttger, 2015). Again, 
the adaptation of training to the maritime domain in 
addition to the fact that the course employed extensive 
use of simulators in addition to classroom training may 
in part explain the deviating finding from previous 
maritime studies (Hobgood et al., 2010; Shapiro et al., 
2004). Also, there could be sample particularities at 
play, since both the other maritime studies employs 
naval bridge officers. Concerning the varying 
attitudinal improvement between the five attitude 
factors, it has been found previously that the different 
attitudes measured by CMAQ show different proneness 
to attitude change (Helmreich et al., 1999). Hence, 
structural differences between the SMAQ versions can 
also be part of the explanation.
H4 posited that the BRM course would improve 
Behavior. Sadly, H4 received no support, as the present 
study failed to produce evidence of behavioral support. 
This is in accordance with previous studies (O’Connor, 
2011; Röttger et al., 2016). However, there are some 
positive tendencies in the present study that might have 
proven statistically significant with a larger sample. Here 
it is prudent to remind the reader that at team level, the 
present sample is down to N=24/26 for the behavior 
measures. This is a mere third of the sample size used to 
test the other hypotheses.
In addition, there are several complicating factors 
contributing to the present result: 1) For the training 
to show behavioral change on the team level, the 
individuals would have to change together in such a 
way that the group dynamic would change. This could 
easily be thwarted by other team members either being 
very good or very poor at the onset. 2) Following 
requests of the ship owner, the BRM training was 
carried out in one standard fashion for bridge officers 
from two vastly different shipping trades. Hence, 
although random counterbalance of the pre- and post-
scenarios were employed, the dramatically different 
technical skills involved will have diluted any effect of 
increased non-technical skills on actual behavior. 3) 
Two out of three raters were professional instructors 
with commercial maritime practice, without special 
training in human factors assessment. It is possible that 
this has contributed to random error, again diluting any 
effect. 4) Since all assessment were done from video 
recordings to prevent researcher bias, the assessors were 
vulnerable to varying quality of both video and audio. 
This may have centered the assessment scores, which 
then leads to smaller group differences and smaller 
effects. 5) Changes in the simulator staff, and occasional 
technical issues, prohibited full experimental control 
in the conduction of the scenarios. It should be noted 
that these are minor issues unproblematic to normal 
simulator training, but which serves to introduce 
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potentially substantial random error in experimental 
measurements. Such random error reduces the internal 
validity of the experiment and would show up in 
reduced group differences and smaller, less statistically 
significant effects.
H5 posited that the relationship between Teamwork 
and Mission success is positively mediated by 
Situation awareness at each point in time.  H5 was 
fully supported, adhering to a general input-process-
output model where Teamwork is seen as a precursor to 
Mission success mediated by Situation awareness. (see 
e.g. Espevik et al., 2006; Espevik et al., 2011a; 2011b; 
Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999). 
That the relationship was fully mediated also underlines 
the importance of including Situation awareness when 
assessing outcomes of BRM training, as it gives fuller 
understanding of the performance of a bridge crew than 
exclusively focusing on Teamwork and Mission Success.
Limitations
The present sample size is problematic in terms of 
statistical power for all analysis except the hypothesis 
testing of H1 regarding training satisfaction and H2 
regarding knowledge improvement. Concerning the 
study’s generalizability, the sample is also limited 
in representing mostly two narrow trades within 
commercial shipping. However, tugboats and offshore 
support vessels may be regarded as extremes on a 
continuum from small to large crews that will envelope 
much of the crew sizes on most commercial shipping. 
Also, the inclusion of both offshore maritime operations 
and coastal navigation in the scenarios makes the 
sampled exercises generalizable to much commercial 
shipping. In addition, substantial heterogeneity in the 
sample in terms of both technical- and non-technical 
skills have increased random error, which would suggest 
the sample not to be overly special.
 Being part of a commercial course, the experimental 
control for the present study was less strict than 
recommended, which constitutes a threat to internal 
validity, increasing random measurement error and 
the likelihood of type-two bias in hypothesis testing. 
However, this lack of experimental control is typical 
of commercial BRM training, and as such this support 
claims of external validity.
 According to Kirkpatrick’s (1976; 2009) recommen- 
dations, the study should have included measures 
of organizational level change. This was dropped 
early in the design faze as it became clear that it was 
logistically impossible to follow the performance 
of the officers as part of their actual bridge teams 
since they were not coursed together as teams. 
Furthermore, the evident challenges for revealing 
any behavioral change in the controlled simulator 
environment precluded any reasonable expectations 
of evaluating the same at organizational level (Röttger 
et al., 2016). 
 Furthermore, it may be discussed whether long term 
behavior change belongs to Kirkpatrick’s level three or 
level four. However, as neither the present study nor 
previous studies have been able to demonstrate even 
short term behavior change in controlled experimental 
settings, any long term effects - especially in natural 
the officers natural environment at work on their own 
vessels – is unlikely with present training schemes and 
experimental designs.
 Effects of history and training are important to 
consider for a study like the present where there is no 
control group not receiving treatment. However, for the 
theoretical test, the questions are interspersed with four 
days and no discussion of correct answers were treated, 
so learning as a bias is unlikely. For the behavioral 
measure, two different scenarios were used that offered 
little concrete transference enabling success in the 
next scenario, other than actually improving resource 
management skills. Concerning historic effects, five 
days is a short period of time that is not likely to produce 
other effects in parallel to the experiment. And lastly, 
distributing the experiment over eight different weeks 
over six months with all experimental conditions 
represented each week should render small chances 
of random historic changes during the experiment. In 
fact, no major incidents were reported with shipowner 
during the six month period of experiment trials.
 Regarding H5, a word of caution is necessary in 
relation to the limitations of OLS regression analyses. 
It cannot test the causality of the modeled structures, 
meaning that the directions of relationships given in 
the models cannot be taken for granted. Alternative 
causal directions could be possible. For instance, a 
model was tested that Mission Success had a positive 
relation to Teamwork, positively mediated by Situation 
awareness. However, all possible mediations combining 
these three variables were tested, and none of the 
alternative mediation models proved significant. A 
more problematic bias could be introduced by 
expectations from the observers who were not blind 
to that particular element of scoring. In other words, 
they could subconsciously see the different behavior 
scores of one session in relation. However, in order to 
fully experimentally control for this, separate observers 
would have been necessary for the different behaviors.
 Regarding the instrument validity, the SMAQ 
questionnaire proved problematic: The factor loading 
could still be clearer, with more balance in the number 
of items for each factor and with higher Cronbach 
alphas. This may have contributed to random error. 
Seeing that the two most obviously comparable studies 
uses two different versions which also have some 
structural issues, a revision is called for (O’Connor, 
2011; Röttger, et al., 2013). 
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General discussion
Limitations notwithstanding, the present study provides 
supporting evidence that it is indeed possible to achieve 
results in resource management training within the 
maritime domain, in the way it has been shown in 
other domains (Hughes et al., 2016; Weaver et al., 2010; 
Espevik, Saus & Olsen, 2017). When the evidence 
from the literature within the maritime domain has 
been meager so far, it should perhaps be viewed in 
connection with certain attributes of the maritime 
domain: 1) The acceptance of risk in shipping is higher 
than in other domains such as aviation and medicine 
(IMO, 2011). 2) The level of academic training amongst 
practitioners and instructors are comparably low. 3) 
The adaptation of BRM training within the commercial 
maritime sector is typically viewed to be relevant for 
any bridge officer situated within commercial shipping, 
be it at a one-man fishing vessel, a large super tanker, 
other tankers- or offshore-related vessels doing highly 
specialized operations, or different kinds of rigs. The 
medical equivalent would be to say that the resource 
management training could use the same scenarios 
for emergency room surgeons, brain surgeons, and 
heart surgeons alike. 4) The requirements for resource 
management training in the maritime domain remain 
far less strict than in other domains. Currently, the 
typical course requirements following the 2010 Manilla 
amendments to the STCW regulations where BRM 
was for the first time made compulsory, is for a generic 
three- or four-day BRM course (International Maritime 
Organization, 2011).
 The fact that the present study is capable of showing 
some improvement in both knowledge and attitude, 
as well as promising tendencies regarding behavior as 
well as evidence for the behavioral connection between 
Teamwork, Situation awareness, and Mission success, 
supports previous calls for domain-relevant training and 
the use of simulator training in addition to classroom 
training (Helmreich et al., 1999; Håvold et al.., 2015; 
O’Connor, 2011; Röttger et al., 2013; 2016).
 It has been noted previously that the level of research 
on themes relevant for resource management training 
has been low within the maritime domain, theoretically 
reducing the value of BRM training (Hetherington, Flin, 
& Mearns, 2006). Lastly, previous calls to the importance 
of scientific evaluation of training programs within 
resource management are as valid as ever, also including 
the maritime domain (Flin et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
the principles laid out for such evaluations are readily 
available and relevant for evidence-based resource 
management training for commercial bridge officers 
(Kirkpatrick, 1976; 2009; Espevik et.al. 2017). However, 
it is presently unclear how organizational change - the 
last level of evidence in prescribed by Kirkpatrick’s 
classic model – should be measured in practical way as 
an experimental outcome. 
Conclusion
The present study produces evidence that adapted 
resource management training employing full-mission 
simulators can indeed be performed to the satisfaction 
of participants and improve relevant knowledge and 
attitudes within the maritime domain. Also, there are 
promising trends, although not statistically significant, 
that it is possible to improve relevant behavior as 
measured in a controlled simulator environment. Finally, 
the present study produces correlational support for the 
association between Teamwork and Mission success, 
positively mediated by Situation awareness. Researchers 
and practitioners alike should aim to specialize the 
BRM-training for more focused maritime trades and 
operations. Furthermore, the developments are needed 
for measuring non-technical skills and safety-relevant 
behavior at the organizational level in order to connect 
this outcome to the evaluation of training regimes.
Key Points 
- Safety relevant knowledge and attitudes can be 
 improved by Bridge Resource Management (BRM) 
 training.
- Training must be adapted to maritime domain to be 
 effective
- Behavioral change was not significant but could be 
 probably achieved with better customized training 
 design.
- Established resource management training theory 
 concerning mechanisms of team behavior was 
 supported.
- Teamwork was related to Mission Success, mediated 
 by Situation awareness.
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